

27 March 1975

GUIDELINES FOR SANITIZING CERTAIN DOCUMENTS
PROVIDED SELECT COMMITTEES

1. The Director of Central Intelligence has sought certain procedural understanding with members of Select Committees reviewing US intelligence activities. Among ^{these} ~~this~~ is an agreement that agencies furnishing documents to the Committees are authorized to excise from these documents, prior to presentation, the names of their personnel under cover* or whose personal safety might be jeopardized as well as those of other individuals whose safety or individual privacy may be jeopardized by disclosure. In general, names of sources, operations, specific details of technical devices and systems maintained in compartmented channels and names of persons and organizations cooperating on a highly confidential basis may be excised.

2. What may be ¹sanitized

While it is not possible to anticipate all requirements which may be levied by the Committees for documenting material and not possible to determine specifically what material should be excised from

* Protection of an individual's cover has two aspects, flexibility in future assignments and thus his career potential and future value to the agency or department.

these documents the following illustrations are offered in certain likely categories. The criteria in all cases should meet the test mentioned above.

3. Collection of Intelligence

(a) The Committee will probably address the matter of how intelligence activities or methods have or may impinge upon individual rights. Documents supporting responses may be sanitized by removal of identities of sensitive agents and informants, covert personnel, and contractual cover arrangements. A descriptive phrase may be substituted, i.e., a foreign journalist, a political official in the opposition party. No sanitization should be used ~~on~~ in connection with names of individuals whose employment or former employment by, or association with a department of agency does not remain secret or for individuals whose present or future activities on behalf of the department or agency do not require that previous cover arrangements remain secret.

(b) Some information may be required with respect to technical intelligence systems including cryptologic and communications activities and reconnaissance capabilities. Almost all of such material is currently handled in compartmentation control channels under various codewords or nicknames. No security threat is perceived by release of these codenames or nicknames in documents. Details of the

technical systems involved, contractual arrangements, funding and/or names of companies or consultants whose participation was obtained under agreement of continued secrecy may be excised from documents. Any question on release of codeword material should be referred to the Program Manager who in turn may consult with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure a consistent approach in the community's sanitization procedure. While documentary samples of intelligence obtained by technical means may be used in support of verbal testimony, no raw product should be provided the Committee for retention. If absolutely required by the Committees, sanitization of such raw product should be conducted to mask the degree of technical capabilities.

4. Intelligence Estimates

Finished intelligence reports of departments and agencies and estimates do not usually contain source identifications and will not ^{normally} require sanitization. However, departments and agencies should review such publications to ensure deletion of source identities.

5. Administration

Information concerning the internal administration arrangements of intelligence agencies may be requested. This may include staffing charts with occupants identified. Sanitization of individual identities of personnel formerly not under cover and now functioning in a cover assignment should be deleted as well as those who may in the future

6. General

The following categories of information or specific examples may arise in any number of circumstances in documentation requested by the Select Committees. In all cases, serious consideration should be given by the department or agency concerned to the deletion of this type of information, prior to providing the document.

Agent or informant names or operational information revealing them.

Details which would reveal the effectiveness of sensitive methods and techniques (1) employed overseas in human source collection, (2) employed for the physical security protection of the department's or agency's personnel or physical environment.

The numbers, locations, times and other indications of recruitment or emplacement of personnel within targetted foreign organizations.

The success or failure of recruitment attempts in any given targetted foreign organization.

Names of selected employees or ex-employees which would endanger lives, create conditions of jeopardy to ongoing operations or bear on an individual's future utility.

Foreign or US sources, official or otherwise who agreed to cooperate under terms of explicit or implied confidentiality, who would be embarrassed or endangered by disclosure of their role.

Identifying information on intelligence services in friendly and neutral countries.

Identifying collaborative operations between the United States intelligence agencies and other foreign intelligence liaison services against targets within the country extending the collaborations or within a jointly targetted third country.

Identifying collaboration with foreign governments in signals intelligence collection, particularly for arrangements which, if revealed, would be politically embarrassing in the countries involved.

Identification of technical intelligence operations of high technical vulnerability and extremely high political sensitivity.

(d) Specific identification of foreign technical collection installations involving high political sensitivity in the host country.

(e) Details or disclosure of monetary arrangements with US and foreign banks, investment houses, etc., in support of foreign intelligence operations.

(f) Specific information on special relationships with private firms established with the approval of top corporate officials. This includes names of firms or industrial associations that provide privileged customers or collaboration or cover for foreign intelligence operations.

(g) Names of firms collaborating with US intelligence agencies in collection and assessment programs (especially those having large foreign clienteles).

7. What Should not be Sanitized

There are also general categories of intelligence activities which have already been placed in the public domain by the mass news media or authors with background experience in intelligence departments or agencies of the community. Names, places, dates and events which have been so revealed should not be excised if contained in requested documents.

There is an increasing body of information which has been released under the Freedom of Information Act. No further sanitization of this material should be conducted unless it relates to an individual's rights to privacy as set forth in the Freedom of Information Act or in interpretations of that Act by the Department of Justice and Attorney General.

8. Techniques of Sanitization

Sanitization of intelligence material is usually considered the act of physical removal of the identity of a person, place or thing from written communication with or without regard for the residual content. Use of a substitution device, either pseudonym or ident is an example of sanitization which permits intelligent continuity of the material without revealing the true identify. Sanitization does not extend to the use of false or misleading substitute material in this context.

In order to maintain the integrity of official records the following sanitization techniques should be applied only to copies of records. The first copy of the record becomes the work copy for sanitization action.

(a) Physical Sanitization - Names may be cut out and the residual material xeroxed and submitted to Committees. Names may be masked with correction tape and then xeroxed. The xerox copy may be submitted to the Committees.

(b) Names may be deleted and replaced with "IDEN." The deleted material is provided on a separate IDEN list which contains names or descriptive phrases substituted for deletions.

(c) The material can be retyped or reprinted with substitute phrases or substitute descriptions which do not reveal the sensitive material.

(d) Entire pages can be removed from some documents and replaced with a blank page carrying only reference information as to the location of the sensitive material within the contributing department or agency. This technique may

be employed when physical sanitization or excision of material results in unintelligible gibberish as residue.

(e) Within a category of inquiry it may be desirable to extract a complete document from requested material when the request is broad and all inclusive within its field. The existence of such a document should be made known to the Committee but retained by the agency or department for review under escort of a representative of the department or agency.

9. Management of Sanitization

Each department and agency should establish a principal officer to coordinate requests from and responses to the Committees with sufficient support in the form of a senior body for review of all materials destined for outside transmittal. This senior body should ^{include current} ~~also provide~~ representation to the Ad Hoc Group of USIB established by the Director of Central Intelligence under the chairmanship of Dr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, to oversee coordination of community responses to questions and issues arising principally within the two Congressional Committees. This group will assist in developing precise comprehensive information needed to answer questions which arise and to

ensure that sensitive names and other details relating to intelligence activities are protected to the greatest extent possible.

All official requests for information from authorized persons should be maintained in a log of pending requests for information citing the specific topic of each request and identifying the requester, the date of request and the suspense date for response. An index should also be maintained of all materials prepared for background use within the agency or department or for outside transmittal. A log of sanitizations is an essential aspect of this record-keeping requirement.

Materials developed within an agency or department in response to questions should be reviewed by command level for completeness, responsiveness and accuracy. The release of such materials as are developed should be authorized originally by the appropriate command level. In the case of documents or material of a community nature, the release will be done in coordination with the Program Manager concerned and the department or agency from which the information is acquired. Proposed sanitization will be highlighted in this coordination.

All documents prepared for outside transmittal should be routed through an executive registry to help ensure the existence of a comprehensive record of all proceedings and to make it possible to locate immediately unsanitized copies of any needed correspondence. Components which create materials for outside transmittal should continue to be offices of record for that material.

10. Coordination

Sanitization of names from material released by one agency may prove to be a futile exercise if not practiced in common by all participating departments and agencies. This proposal can serve only as general guidelines on sanitization. It is essential to the proposal that departments and agencies be willing to employ the same criteria for sanitization and coordinate as required. Final authority to sanitize any material should rest with the Program Manager or the controlling department or agency.

This indicates the desirability of each agency informing holders of documents which are sanitized of this action. Notices of sanitization should be addressed to the principal coordinators within each department or agency. For the present these individuals may be considered to be the members of [] Ad Hoc Group of USIB STATINTL. A list of names and addresses is attached for convenience.

/draft/

[]

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000300070009-4

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 15px;"></div>		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Attached is a first cut at

Sanitization Guides.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
-----------------------------------	------

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP82M00591R000300070009-4

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

STATINTL

STATINTL

(1)

Previous expressions of Sanitization needs & Criteria

STATINTL ⁽¹⁾ ~~Secret~~ Name guidelines & suggested rewrite 2/13/75

"No names except those of well-known individuals
In place of names - the word "Iden" followed by
a number and matching separate list with names
considered on loan to Commission and to be returned to Agency."

"~~Delete~~" names ~~from the list~~ - the disclosure
of which could destroy vital cover arrangements
essential to the ~~continued~~ continuation of the
Agency's future operations. Does not apply to
individuals whose employment or former employment
by or associated with the CIA does not remain
secret or for individuals whose present or
future activities on behalf of the CIA do
not require that any previous cover arrangements
remain secret.

...
In addition to those whose names are deleted
to protect cover, names of others may be unusually
sensitive."

② Employee Bulletin 28 February 1975

Source: DCI Letter to Chairman, Commission 5 Feb 1975

"... As has been discussed with the Commission there are certain sensitive items which should receive special handling. Such items include names of sources, specific details of technical devices and systems maintained in compartmented channels by the Agency, names of employees, names of persons who may be targets of kidnapping or assassination by foreign intelligence organizations, names of organizations cooperating with the Agency, and detailed information which would pinpoint any of the above....

I believe, however, in most cases these specific identifying names and details are not necessary for an understanding of our activities.... Where in the judgment of the employee a specific identification is especially sensitive as outlined in this paragraph, and ~~identifying~~ identity numbers will be assigned pending resolution of the matter between the Commission and the Agency, and in the meantime the identity will not be divulged by the employee.

② Source Seccom - D. 37 : 5 Feb 1975

Agreements to be sought

"2. It would also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies furnishing documents to the committees be authorized to excise from those documents, prior to presentation the names of their personnel as well as those of other individuals whose safety or individual privacy may be jeopardized by disclosure. This would include names of sources or specific information on highly technical devices and operations in keeping with the DCI's responsibilities to protect sources and methods."

(4)

4. Source Attachment to letter to S. oncraft from Director

24 February 1975 TS - 206734 - 75.

"Scenarios for discussion with the Assistant to the
~~President~~ President for National Security Affairs.

"In some cases, those agencies furnishing documents to the Committees should be authorized to excise from those documents, prior to presentation, the names of their personnel under cover or whose personal safety may be jeopardized as well as those of other individuals whose safety or individual privacy may be jeopardized by disclosure. Also excised should be names of sources, operations, specific details of technical devices and systems maintained in compartmented channels and names of organizations cooperating on a highly confidential basis.

"That in view of their susceptibility to foreign countermeasures details of the technology of the technical collection programs which have been placed under strict access rules should not be required.

continued

(5)

24 Feb 1975 letter to Searcy from DCS also contains
a guide for degrees of disclosure with examples of
interest.

" ... Where elaborations (on covert action operations,
funding, etc) or access to raw files for either
covert action or collection matters is specifically
requested, the names of employees, contractors
or others ~~not~~ involved will be masked by
substituting, idems or some description of the
nature or type of person involved, i.e., a
foreign journalist, a high political official in
the opposition party, etc. "

" As cited above, the names of sensitive agents and
informants, certain covert personnel, contractual
cover arrangements, etc., will be masked or
descriptive phrases substituted. "

" ... If required, information with respect to
technical intelligence systems including cryptologic
and communications activities and reconnaissance
capabilities will be provided on a selective
basis under appropriate security ground rules. This

information will be kept as generalized as possible.
General commentary on contractual arrangements,
funding, and the like can be provided if requested.

Source

A CONFIDENTIAL paper titled "Categories of Material by Sensitivity. undated. Contains some guidance on material that ^{perhaps} should be sanitized. Three categories are addressed: i "Cannot be divulged"; ii "Arguable"; and iii "Can Be Divulged if Security is Assured."

~~Sanitization~~ Guidance for Protection of Intelligence
~~Sources and methods in material provided Select~~
Committees of the US Senate and House of Representatives

There are some matters, Mr. Chairman, that I am required under statute and as a professional to protect against any chance of exposure. The names of our agents, the names of many patriotic Americans who have voluntarily worked with us, and the specifics of a number of our costly and delicate technical systems are so important, Mr. Chairman, that I believe an additional level of secrecy is necessary to protect them... There is also a range of specific methods for gathering information that needs to be secret....

I will certainly consult with you Mr. Chairman and the ranking minority member to determine the best course of action to protect these sensitive details."

to Source

Draft of Statement by W.E. Colby to the Senate Select
Committee Investigating Intelligence Activities

Carl F. Jones